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1. Getting started
1
 
 
 
“My main conclusion is that we still do not know enough about the workings of national innovation 
systems to design effective policies for improving the flow of finance - and technology transfers - to SMEs. 
...it may be that we should be promoting the role of intermediares and brokers in the financing and 
technology transfer process, if research can identify effective means for doing so”. (Bannock, 1995, p.8) 
 
The above is part of the conclusion made by one of the speakers at the EIMs workshop on Innovation Financing 
in Luxembourg, december 1995. It points out that more research is still needed in order to know how to 
improve financing of innovation in european nations. This is echoed in The Green Paper on Innovation from The 
Commission of december 1995 in which it is stated that  
 
“The Community’s ability to innovate depends largely on the effectiveness of its innovation financing 
system.....Financing is the obstacle to innovation most often quoted by firms, whatever their size, in all 
Member States of the European Union and in virtually all sectors.....the results of SME surveys show that 
the European innovation financing system is full of holes,........(p.28-29) 
 
Thus, it is recognized that innovation financing is very important in promoting innovation. It is also pointed out 
that more research is needed to guide the policies. This expressed need is in contrast to the limited amount of 
research within the area. Although there has been some contributions (e.g. Prakke, 1988, Dosi, 1990, 
Christensen, 1992, OECD, 1993, 1996a) most of these are limited in scope and/or focus on a specific set of 
problems like the development of the venture capital industry.  
 
There are several reasons for this deficiency. One is probably the intrinsic impossibility of estimating the 
optimal level of innovation financing. Financial instutions function as selection mechanisms by not financing 
projects assessed as not commercially viable. However, this assessment is an ex ante selection based on 
guesses about the future whereas the actual outcome is only possible to measure ex post. In other words there 
should be financial barriers to innovation but it is not possible to estimate to which degree there should be 
barriers. This impossibility mean that arguments for market failure and policy action towards correcting these 
failures are empirically shaky and therefore often based on deduction.  
 
                                                 
  1  This paper builds on work done in a research project for The European Commission. It is part of a TSER-project 
called Innovation Systems and European Integration (ISE). A draft report is due by the end of february and is to be 
presented in Athens in march. Due to space limits this paper present selected issues from the work on the draft report. 
Likewise we have reduced the number of countries dealt with. We have also chosen to limit the amount of statistics in 
this presentation, mainly due to space limits. 
Another reason why studies on this issue are few is that it is rarely possible to seperate the financing of 
innovation and financing of the firm as a whole. When financiers assess a project proposal they take into 
consideration what is the viability of all the activities (in some cases including possible other potential 
businesses of this potential customer like insurance) of the firm and not just the innovation project. This 
complicates studies of innovation financing. 
 
Finally, one should also mention the lack of statistics. This goes not only for the limited information in the data 
we have on some of the areas relevant for innovation financing (like in different surveys of barriers to 
innovation) but also for what we have statistics for at all. There is no doubt, for instance, that the informal 
venture capital and the corporate venture capital is of great importance. However, we are not in a position to 
quantify the importance of these sources and the policies aimed at improving access to these sources are 
sparse. 
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Our ambition with the present study is to add to the existing pool of knowledge on innovation financing in a 
way that could contribute to the design of effective means of improving innovation financing. 
 
We try to fulfill this ambition in the following way: 
 
First, it is important to specify the institutional context of innovation financing. Different financial systems 
support different types of investments differently. We shall in our first analysis consider what types of 
interaction/transactions are promoted in each system. The process of european integration and the 
consequences for innovation has been investigated previously. Here we highlight some of the basic properties 
and changes of financial systems in the past ten years in order to investigate if there is a similar integration 
process with respect to financial systems. The general believe is that many European countries have moved 
towards the UK/US-mode of financial system. In other words there is a convergence trend of financial systems. 
We expect to get closer to the hard facts behind this believe. The hypothesis underlying the research is that the 
macro aspects and the micro aspects of the problem are interrelated. It matters for the interaction between 
borrower and lender what the institutional context is. This is in turn of great impact on innovation. 
 
In order to arrive at some policy conclusions we then consider the scope for policies through discussion on how 
to change financial systems or in other words explanations to why national financial systems differ. 
 
Third, we discuss possible best practices of financial systems with respect to innovation financing by 
differentiating between different kinds of transactions, different types of firms and different types of capital. 
 
Fourth, we shall embark on one specific institutional arrangement for innovation financing. At least in its 
original concept the venture capital industry is adequate for innovation financing. A closer look may reveal pros 
and cons of this solution.  
 
As mentioned our agenda is to see the findings in relation to policy. Before going too far in policy 
recommandations one should bear in mind that it is not the only task of the financial system to finance 
innovations- far from it. But given the increasing importance of firms not beeing static in a dynamic world, and 
given the importance of innovation in growth and job creation, governments are interested in promoting 
innovations. It is an important policy issue precisely what type of financial system Europe need in order to 
promote innovations? Is there a “best practice”, or should financial systems entail several of the features of 
both market based and credit based systems in order to improve the dynamics and limit sensibility of the 
system?  
2. A picture of financial systems
2
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this section we shall take a closer look upon differencies between national financial systems: This is an 
intermediary step towards discussing the ability of different systems to support different types of investments 
and different types of firms. After a mainly quantitative description of differences between national financial 
systems in some major European countries
3
 and the US and Japan, which typically are presented as 
representative countries of different types of financial systems, we turn to discuss qualitative features of 
different systems in section three. 
 
2.2. A taxonomy and description of financial systems 
 
Financial systems are traditionally divided into two main types (OECD, 1993; Zysman, 1983): 
                                                 
  2 We thank John Zysman for valuable comments on this section. 
  3 France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom. Germany is not included due to lack of detailed data. 
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i) a system based on capital markets, and 
ii) a credit based system. 
 
In a stylized capital market based system stocks and bonds are the predominant source of long-term industrial 
funds. In such a system the central function of bank lending is to serve short-term purposes. Borrower and 
lender often meet across competitive markets with the help of intermediary institutions. Entrance to and exit 
from different financial holdings are quite simple processes, making this the most common ways for lenders to 
execute their influence (Zysman, 1983, p. 70-72). 
 
In a stylized credit based system capital markets play a relatively weak role in providing long-term capital 
compared to financial institutions. In credit based systems there are fewer arrangements for an easy exit, which 
makes financial institutions more loyal to their borrowers. Consequently, “voice” is the common way for 
lenders to execute influence in customer companies (Zysman, 1983, p. 70-72).  
 
In relation to innovation financing, venture capital is typically a major source of funding for high risk/uncertain 
projects in the market based systems.
4
 In the credit based systems, intrapreneurship (entrepreneurs inside 
companies, i.e. internal financing) and/or bank consortia play a major role in providing risk capital (OECD, 1993, 
p. 69). 
 
The purpose of the present section is to explore: 
                                                 
  4 See section 5 for a more elaborate discussion of venture capital. 
i) whether it is possible to find distinctive features of national financial systems as described in table 2.1 
below, and 
ii) whether the differences between the systems have changed in the past decade. 
 
The countries included in the analysis are divided into two major groupings on the basis of their characteristics 
in the initial stage of the period analysed. 
 
Table 2.1: A static typology of national financial systems 
 
Major grouping 
 
Market based 
 
Credit based 
 
Countries 
 
US, UK, Netherlands 
 
 Japan, France, Italy, Spain 
 
Debt/equity 
 
Relatively low 
 
Relatively high 
 
Major financing 
instruments 
 
Retained earnings and, to a lesser 
extent, bonds and new equity 
issues 
 
Loans and retained earnings 
 
Price mechanism of capi-
tal allocation 
 
Market processes (including 
speculation) determine key prices 
 
Markets are imperfectly cleared by prices 
Source: Zysman, 1983; OECD, 1993. 
 
2.2.1. The importance of debt and bank credits in financing firms 
 
The first feature mentioned in table 2.1 is the debt/equity-ratio. The debt/equity-ratio in credit based financial 
systems is relatively higher than in market-based systems due to assumed close relationships between lenders 
and borrowers, and due to the fact that some firms have difficult access to funds on the capital market. 
Financial institutions tend to allow firms a higher debt/equity ratio because monitoring of firms is easier - and 
more necessary (Christensen, 1992, p. 151). 
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Figure 2.1 reveals that the difference in 
debt/equity ratios between the major 
European countries (with the exception of 
Italy which has a disproportionally high 
number of very small firms) and the US 
and Japan has decreased radically since 
the mid-80's. Looking at the initial capital 
structure the US stands out with a very 
low debt to equity ratio, which is 
characteristic for market based systems. 
The debt to equity ratio in the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom is just 
above 1, and combined with the fact that 
bank financing amount to just 10-15 per 
cent of total liabilities in these countries, 
this indicates a market based structure for 
these countries as well. Italy, Japan and 
France have debt to equity ratios above 2 
in the early 1980's - a clear indication of a credit based system, while Spain is in between but with bank and 
trade credits accounting for 40 per cent of total liabilities, which is a quite strong credit orientation. 
 
The general picture is one of convergence where countries starting out with a high debt to equity ratio 
experiences an increase in equity, which reduces the debt to equity ratio,
5
 while the US, which has the lowest 
debt/equity ratio during the whole period, experiences an increase in the ratio due to a stagnation in equity 
and a moderate increase in debt. In the middle group are the UK and Netherlands, where debt and equity have 
had parallel growth rates in the observed period. This development is making it increasingly more difficult to 
make a clear distinction between credit based and market based financial systems based on the debt/equity 
ratio alone. 
 
A second factor determining patterns of financial systems is the major financing instruments. According to table 
2.1 loans are a major source of capital in credit-based systems, while it, apart from retained earnings, is bonds 
and new equity issues, which are the most important financing instruments in market based systems. Figure 2.2 
show the relative importance of bank credits in financing industry measured as short and long term bank 
credits as a percentage of the total liabilities. A high percentage of bank credits indicates a financial system 
oriented towards credit, while a low percentage indicates a market based financial system. 
                                                 
  5 An economic factor behind the tendency towards a decreasing debt to equity ratio in the majority of countries is a 
decreasing  ratio of inflation in the 1980's in all countries involved in the analysis (OECD, 1996a). The tendency is 
expected to continue due to an increased demand for security - as expressed by low debt/equity ratios - from banks 
in their loan policies after a number of bank failures in the early 90's. 
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With the exception of Japan, which is in a category of its own with regards to the relative importance of bank 
credits, the difference between the countries has diminished since the mid-80's.  The decreasing importance 
of back credit in France, Japan, Spain and to a lesser degree Italy (i.e. countries with credit based systems) is 
due to either a stagnation or slow growth in bank credits, while the US and, to a lesser degree the Netherlands, 
with their market dominated systems, have had a higher growth  rate of bank credits compared to liabilities. 
The tendency for the UK, which started out with a relatively high importance of bank credit considering the 
status as a market based system, is less clear since the lack of data from 1990 and onwards makes it impossible 
to determine whether the growth in 
the relative importance of bank 
credits is a lasting tendency. 
 
Capital markets play a relatively weak 
role in providing long-term capital 
compared to financial institutions in 
credit based systems. Statistics on the 
share of long term bank credits to 
total liabilities (figure 2.3) show that 
the tendency of convergence - and 
the exceptional role of Japan - which 
was evident from figure 2.2 showing 
the relative importance of total bank 
credit to total liabilities, is also evident 
here. 
 
The development indicates that the countries 
traditionally characterised as having credit 
based financial systems, with the exception of 
Japan, are moving towards a situation with 
less importance played by long-term bank 
credits. This is a consequence of bank credits 
playing a diminishing overall role since an 
analysis of bank credits alone show that 
long-terminism is being more predominant.
6
 
 
2.2.2 Equity markets
7
 
 
                                                 
  6 Calculated from OECD Financial Statistics, part III 1993 and 1994. 
  7 This section only concerns the major European countries since data is  not available for the US and Japan. 
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Debt and bank credits are just one side of the story 
about characteristics of financial systems, the other 
side being equity markets. Figure 2.4 illustrates the 
size of the equity markets by measuring the domestic 
equity  in relation to GDP. UK stands out with a 
domestic equity equal to GDP in 1992 and remarkably larger 
than GDP in 1993. The high level of domestic equity in 
the UK is in accordance with the low debt to equity ratio 
illustrated in figure 2.1. 
 
Using another indicator we can verify the impression 
from figure 2.4: The UK equity market is the fastest 
growing market. Figure 2.5 show a growth rate of 10 per 
cent per annum from 1993 to 1995. The remaining 
countries show more moderate growth rates - in the 
Dutch and Spanish cases after very high growth ratio in 
the late 1980's. 
 
The fact that UK has the most developed equity market 
is in accordance with the traditional separation between 
market based and credit based financial systems. There 
are considerable differences between the other 
(traditionally credit based) European countries when 
considering the importance of equity markets, but the 
characterisation of the Netherlands as a market based 
system is being confirmed. 
 
 
 
The equity market cannot be explored by listed shares only though. Figure 2.6 shows the size of the domestic 
markets for traded shares on parallel or unlisted markets measured as number of companies with shares 
traded on these markets as a percentage of total number of companies on listed securities markets.
8
 France 
has the largest parallel and unlisted markets compared to the listed market, while the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom and Italy have markets amounting to15-25 per cent of the listed markets. Unlisted and parallel 
markets play a very small role in Spain, but as illustrated in figure 2.7 the markets grew rapidly in 1989-’90. 
 
The quite developed parallel and unlisted markets for especially France could be interpreted as an indication of 
                                                 
  8 When the parallel and unlisted markets are considered small numbers makes the percentages very sensitive. 
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a potential for a stronger market orientation, i.e. a further evening out of the differences between what used to 
be credit based and market based financial systems. 
 
2.2.3 Integration and internationalisation 
 
The introduction of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) in 1979 marked the beginning of a process of 
deregulation and integration through diminishing 
capital control in Europe. An aimed consequence of 
the deregulation is that the role played by market 
mechanisms in determining where economic agents 
chose to invest and obtain their capital is 
strengthened. Controls on deposit and lending rates 
have been relaxed and most controls of foreign 
currency transactions and international capital 
movements have been lifted. OECD (1993, p. 43) views 
liberalisation and globalization as enhancing the 
overall efficacy and flexibility of the financial systems 
and as introducing more uniformity into national 
financing conditions. 
 
The fact that most countries have experienced an 
increasing inter-nationalisation of bank credits (figure 
2.8) indicates that internationalisation and integration 
has played a role in the development of the 
credit markets in the past decade. But bank 
credit is still largely a national affair, 
especially for the larger countries while the 
Netherlands have experienced a drastic 
increase in foreign bank credits since the 
mid 80's. 
 
The time series available for internationalisation of 
equity markets are shorter than for bank credits 
which hampers the possibilities of analysing the ten-
dency over a longer period of time. Again it is the 
smallest country, the Netherlands, which shows the 
highest degree of internationalisation with almost 
half of the companies listed on the national 
securities markets being foreign, while the United 
Kingdom and France have 20 to 30 per cent foreign 
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companies listed on their national securities markets. Foreign companies play a disappearingly small role in 
Spain and Italy where the equity markets are quite small and undeveloped. 
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The above analysis shows, that even though there are reminiscences of two distinctive types of financial 
systems, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to divide national financial systems into two main categories 
according to their orientation towards either market transactions or bank credit based on quantitative statistics 
alone: both means of raising funds are present in all countries, and there are tendencies of increasing 
importance of credit in traditional market based systems, and increasing importance of market transactions in 
traditional credit based systems. 
 
Even though there are clear signs of convergence between national financial systems in quantitative statistics, 
this cannot be perceived as the total picture of the development of the national financial systems though. The 
reasons why differences still occur are discussed in the following section. 
 
3. Explaining the Differences 
 
Above we have shown that differences between financial systems diminish although they are still there. But we 
have not explained neither why the differences seem to be still smaller nor why they have not completely 
disappeared in the past decade. This section attempts to answer these questions. 
 
3.1 Reasons for Convergence 
 
A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that financial systems converge and many claim that they will 
continue to do so. Arguments for this point of view are based on the trend towards internationalization in 
general. That is, it is claimed that information technologies render the opportunities for financial institutions to 
do their trade more or less borderless and around the clock. In addition, the information technology facilitates 
the introduction and use of financial innovations which often come about as a reaction to regulations.  
 
Very often it is claimed that deregulation is a major force behind convergence. However, careful studies of the 
development in regulations suggests that what has happened is rather a reregulation. This means that some 
regulations have disappeared but others have emerged. In other words a reshuffling of the areas subject to 
regulation has taken place. In general quantitative controls have been relaxed and the focus of government 
intervention is now more on support of markets and price setting. This has increased competition at the same 
time as government intervention has increased  (see e.g. Vogels (1996)). Deregulation in itself can therefore 
not explain convergence. 
 
A second argument for why financial systems converge is the growth of multinationals. These firms are able to 
reshuffle their capital between divisions and raise capital on financial markets abroad (cf. the increasing 
amount of cross-border credits displayed in table 2.XX). Some of them even issue their own commercial papers. 
The growing importance of these multinationals relative to the total capital contribute to wipe out differences 
between financial systems and make financing sources for these firms more global. 
 
Thirdly, not only the cross-border trade with physical products and related monetary transfers have increased. 
Especially the pure monetary transfers have increased. One of the reasons behind this trend is a general 
increase in risk and a derived wish to use hedging instruments and to diversify portfolios on assets in several 
countries. The possibilities of this have been facilitated by the development of information technologies. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that entry of foreign financial institutions has increased in a long time 
perspective. This trend has though been more or less intense depending on the part of the financial sector and 
time period in question. The insurance companies have managed to establish retail networks in many countries 
as opposed to the mortgage business. The banking sector has tried an  internationalisation process but has 
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withdrawn these activities in the first half of the 1990s. Now it seems as if a number of banks are trying again 
although this is mainly in whole sale international financial services. International expansion in retail financial 
services is very limited as explained in further detail in the next section.  
 
3.2  Reasons for Divergence 
 
Differences between financial systems today may be explained by factors related to both the quantitative 
character of the society of which the financial system is a part but also to the nature of the financial system 
itself. As illustrated above there are still differences between nations although these have diminished. One 
indication is that there are enduring, significant interest rate differentials between nations. In the following we 
shall discuss some explanations to why there are differences. These explanations will not so much be related to 
the specific nations although we recognize there may be specific events in the nations which are important in 
such an explanation.  
 
Some of the most important reasons why there are limits to the convergence process are the following.  First 
of all there are hindrances to a physical establishment of financial institutions abroad. These hindrancies 
include entry costs (building up reputation, knowledge about tax system, legislation and customers)  - costs 
that are substantial for banks in foreign markets - especially in small markets. In particular, customers 
confidence in foreign banks has proven to be smaller than in a domestic bank. This links to another hindrance 
which is the funding of the financial institution. Most often access to first order savings are restricted for 
foreign banks who then have to rely on funding in their home market.  
 
Furthermore, in some countries the structural characteristics of the national industry may be a barrier for 
foreign banks in that a relatively large number of small and medium sized firms mean high costs on monitoring 
and credit judgement compared to the volume of lending. Asymmetries in information is likely to be higher 
when operating in new, foreign markets, and many firms wants non-standardized  services. Industrial finance 
is thus both labour-intense and subject to severe limits to produce the services in a standardized, central 
manner. This in turn limits the crowding-out of small, national financial institutions by large, internationally 
active institutions (Vitols, 1995, p.26). 
 
Related to this argument it is likely that differences between nations in their modes and structures of 
production will mean differences in demand for types and/or amount of capital. For example, demand for 
capital may be determined by the relative importance of firms who are capital or labour intensive, knowledge 
based, or if they are based in industries where physical assets can be made liquid and therefore used as 
collateral. 
 
A very important reason is that - in spite of deregulation of some areas of economic activity  and 
harmonization - regulation of certain areas of the financial systems continue to be national. Thus, Vitols (1995, 
p.6) list four areas where the state maintains significant regulatory discretion:  
‘the regulation of corporate governance, which involves the relationship between financial institutions and 
non-financial companies;  
the regulation of household savings, which affects financial institutions’ and non-financial companies’ access to 
funds;  
the regulation of financial sector internal governance, which affects the goals and capacities of financial 
institutions; and  
the regulation of special-purpose credit institutes, which influences the risk profiles faced by financial institutes 
or allow the state to directly allocate resources to the non-financial company sector‘. 
 
It seems fair to conclude that even if the data in chapter 2 indicate convergence of financial systems, then there 
are reasons to believe that there are limits to this process. Moreover, conclusions at a very aggregate level 
needs to be modified. Thus, there are different segments of financial markets, each of them subject to different 
degrees of internationalisation. It seems as if wholesale markets with universially tradeable securities are 
largely international, although generally mostly accessable by large firms and governments. These globally 
traded financial products include foreign exchange (included various hedging instruments), large corporate 
loans, stock and bond trading, major corporate insurance risks and commodity trading (Morgan and Knight, 
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1997, p.6). Although these financial markets are often referred to as “global” they are only truely global in one 
sense of the word, that is prices are set at a global scale and all financial institutions may participate in the 
market place. But they are not global in geographical terms. In fact, these markets are largely confined to only a 
few market places, notably London, New York and Tokyo, secondarily Paris and Frankfurt. 
 
Retail markets, on the other hand, persist to be national. This has been discussed above: regulations, 
distribution patterns and consumer habits vary between countries. In particular the latter explanation - 
consumer habits - is powerful. This is examplified by the fact that The European Union has provided legislation 
for financial institutions to operate on equal terms in markets abroad. However, only a few financial institutions 
have become truly international in retail financial services. 
 
 
3.3. Regulation of Financial Systems 
 
A further aspect of regulation is how efficient regulation is in the first place. Seen from a policy perspective it is 
of utmost importance to what extend regulation is able to change financial systems. Opinions on this issue 
differ a lot and has done so for long. Thus, Cox (1986, p.14-15) argues that truly, as Zysman (1983) pointed out, 
governments have to recognize that the structure of financial systems is a constraint on implementation of 
policies. The scope of possible policies is limited by the existing institutional set-up of financial systems and 
policies that are not compatible with this set-up are likely to render disfunctional political conflicts and failure 
of industrial policy. This allow us to some extent to understand the relative economic successes of post-war 
Japan, Sweden, France and West Germany. As Cox mentions 
 
"These countries have fashioned policies which have not challenged the structure of the financial 
system. Other countries - Britain in particular - have attempted to implement industrial policies 
without the requisite financial structure of controls to facilitate a positive state role, and this has led 
to disfunctional and economically wasteful political conflict." (ibid., p.14) 
 
But Zysman and Cox do not agree on a fundamental causality in this regard. Whereas Zysman argues that for 
instance France and Japan have state-led economies due to their credit based, government influenced financial 
systems, Cox reverses the argument. In his view the credit based, government influenced financial systems in 
Japan and France are results of a deliberate choice to have state-led economies. The U.S. and the U.K. have 
capital market systems because they choose not to be state-led economies. 
 
Probably the truth is somewhere in between these arguments. The financial system should not be viewed as an 
immutable, constraining entity. Governments have scope for changing financial systems and adjust financial 
institutions to industrial policy rather than adjusting policies to the structures of financial systems. But, on the 
other hand, such a change does not take place over night. Financial systems have grown in importance relative 
to the rest of the economy in most of the western economies. In addition, financial systems have become more 
interrelated than hitherto was the case. Both these facts give a certain inertia in changing financial systems.  
 
Furthermore, this inertia is enhanced by a financial system lock-in effect. This effect has to do with the 
development of competence and division of labour within financial institutions. If a certain kind of transaction 
frequently occurres in one type of system competences and economies of scale in undertaking this transaction 
will improve further, enhancing competitiveness in that particular business. Implementing policies that requires 
new kinds of transactions may be costly because it takes time to build competence in undertaking these 
transactions efficiently.  
 
Having said this about regulation it is clear that national regulation and legislation differ widely. These 
differences have important implications for division of labour between financial institutions, for the possibilities 
of exercising corporate control, for their concentration, capital-reserve requirements and consequently for 
their industrial investments. In general the capital market oriented financial systems, notably the U.S., impose 
the most extensive restrictions on banking. The Japanese banking sector is also heavily regulated - probably 
even more regulated than the U.K. banks. The U.K. have a number of restrictions on the market for corporate 
control. It may sound a bit paradoxical that market oriented systems have such extensive regulations but it 
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reflects that a well-functioning "pure" market requires the establishing of well-defined rules of the game. 
 
Deregulation may really have negative effects on the financing of corporate investments, but deregulation may 
also be an advantage. It depends on the specific type of regulation and the specific area which is regulated. As 
already mentioned regulations exist on how much financial institutions are allowed to be involved in industrial 
firms. Experience from Germany with universal banking and heavy involvement of banks in non-financial 
enterprises are of course not completely paritive, but nevertheless it has been claimed throughout the 
literature that this experience indicates that borrower-lender relationships are enhanced which in turn may 
facilitate financing of industrial firms, in particular these cases where assessment of the management team and 
the future prospects of the firm is essential because collateral cannot be provided, or because the firm is 
relatively new with no track record.  
 
Thus, the ability of German financial institutions to provide firms with long-term debt financing is beyond 
question. However, there is research indicating that this may be ascribed not only to the nature of the 
relationships between banks and non-financial enterprises but also to the regulatory framework.
9
 It has been 
shown that the German banking system is in fact, strictly regulated but regulated differently than in other 
countries. It has been debated in the US how the US regulation of ownership and banking could be relaxed and 
it has been claimed that the German banks lack regulations. On the contrary, the German financial sector is 
heavily regulated through other regulatory mechanisms than the traditional interest rate controls and financial 
market segmentation. A prudential, uniform regulation with clear quantitative standards have privileged banks 
and limited price competition. This in turn, has contributed to financial stability and long term investments 
(Vitols, 1995/308). In most other countries pension funds and other institutional investors are not allowed to, 
or limited in, holding a substantial equity stake in non-financial enterprises and they are critizised for being too 
short termed in their investment policy. Deregulation in such areas may be a step forward with respect to 
financing long-term investments. Additional explanations relate to the fact that nations differ in the 
diversification of financial institutions, concentration of capital, the structures of industry and the openness of 
the economy. 
 
Although we believe that the factors pointed to above are important driving forces in the dynamics of financial 
systems, then the set of explanations provided here are not giving us the full picture for all countries. To explain 
the institutional set-up of a single country it is necessary to be much more specific.
10
 A further differentiation 
of type of transaction and type of firm to be financed is needed. 
 
                                                 
  9  Vitols (1995/308) claims that the regulatory framework is more important than the nature of the relationships in this respect. On the other hand it is 
likely that these two explanations are intertwined. 
  10  Knight and Morgan (eds., 1997) is one recent collection of articles describing a number of national financial 
systems. 
4. Financing Different Types of Transactions 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In this section we discuss som principle modes of functioning of the financial systems and their ability to finance 
different kinds of investments. We thus turn from a mainly structural comparison of financial systems to a view 
emphasizing the capacity of different financing sources to finance different types of transactions. 
 
More specifically, we discuss what financing mechanisms are  better at financing one-time, standard 
transactions versus more discretionary transactions. In table 2.1. we listed some of the major financing 
instruments in a typology of financial systems. We discuss the internal finance, financing through intermediares 
and financing through markets. 
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This discussion is used to apply the considerations in chapter 3 and this one closer to the case of innovation 
financing rather than financing investments in general. 
 
4.2. A Micro-view on Financing Different Transactions 
 
When the financing process concern an uncertain activity agents take appropriate measures to reduce or 
compensate for the uncertainty in advance. Thus, while making a contract initial uncertainty on what is to 
follow is substantial. But recognizing that the contract is "incomplete" at the outset, in the sense that not all 
possible future states of nature are taken into account, makes agents ensure that contracts can be adapted to 
changing conditions. 
 
The purpose of investment determines the degree of incompleteness of contracts and the likely needs for ex 
post adjustments. For example, the degree of asset specificity has an impact on whether there is a secondary 
market for the assets and consequently how worthy they are as collateral. The increasingly large proportion of 
human capital in production is one example of such specific assets which will induce a high degree of 
discretionary contracting. Another example is the one-time type of transaction. A third example is innovations, 
especially more radical innovations.  
 
If a certain type of transaction occurs frequently, the skills to evaluate its likely outcome cost effectively are 
often available or are generated over time, while the unfamiliar kinds of transaction may incur greater costs for 
screening and monitoring than anticipated (Neave, 1991, p.27). Learning by doing is, in other words, important 
as a means of reducing costs in transactions in that some kinds of transactions may be subject to 
standardization of screening techniques while other, less frequently occurring transactions, like financing of 
innovations, may need discretionary treatment. 
 
Whether one or another kind of transaction is regularly occurring or not depends on the specific institutional 
surroundings. The traditions and production structure of the national industry are thus contributing to what 
are the most common kinds of transactions. Financiers are likely to be reluctant to enter unfamiliar 
transactions unless they are relatively certain on the outcome or, the outcome seems to be well over average. 
Competition may force financial institutions to minimise operating costs and this is mainly possible in familiar 
transactions
11
. 
 
Capabilities to handle these different kinds of transactions differ according to which type of financing 
mechanism is chosen. In general, the more transactions are characterized by uncertainty and discretion then 
the more screening and monitoring capabilities are needed (Williamson, 1988). Vice versa frequently occurring 
standard transactions under risk need limited screening and monitoring, and learning effects are reduced to a 
minimum. 
 
The market based way of financing implies the least developed governance capabilities as continuous 
supervision is difficult when buyers and sellers in the market are anonymous and dealing on a once and for all 
basis. The standardized way of trading and the small amount of screening and monitoring possibly make the 
market way of financing superior in terms of costs. Calculable, homogeneous and simple forms of transactions 
are thus channeled through this market. 
 
In contrast, financing by intermediaries or internal financing provides greater capabilities for learning and ex 
post adjustment of the incomplete contracts resulting from uncertainty. In an intermediary or internally in an 
organization both initial screening procedures and subsequent monitoring and reporting requirements are 
more thorough than in the corresponding market governance mechanism.
12
 
                                                 
  11  Another strategy is to specialize in order to screen only a few types of transactions and to accumulate knowledge 
in this special activity within the organization. 
  12  In principle differences between the intermediary way and the internal way of financing are smaller than those 
between markets and intermediaries. However, there is a difference, mostly a matter of degree, between capabilities for 
continuously monitoring. Another difference is that opportunistical behaviour is less likely to occur and presumably is 
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Arguments on relationship banking vis a vis arms-length financing in the literature thus points to fundamental 
differences in these two financing mechanisms ability to support different kinds of transactions. 
 
In summation, the preliminary conclusion from the above is that intermediaries or internal financing are the 
most relevant mechanisms of financing when investing in discretionary investments like innovations because 
they are better capable dealing with uncertainty compared to the market way of financing. However, it matters 
if the innovation in question is radically new or if its a minor change. In industries such as biotech and 
electronics product life cycles are often short and degrees of radicality high which means that prior knowledge 
of establishments is at best sparse. It may even be argued that it is advantageous if there are no established 
routines as conservatism may be particular damaging towards such major shifts in technology. Well-established 
screening and monitoring capabilities thus tend to be hostile to financing more radical, new innovations. This is 
in contrast to the market based financing mechanism, here we do not see the same rigidity in financing new 
start-ups based on high technology. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
less costly when it does. Finally, internal financing rules out any legal problems connected to ex post adjustment. 
However, this conclusion is too general, and may produce odd results if standing alone. For example, venture 
capital institutions are often said to undertake thorough screening and monitoring of firms. However, venture 
capital is wide spread exactly in countries with a market based financial system (U.K., U.S., Netherlands). 
Explaining this seemingly paradox must take three things into account. First, the proportions of the financial 
systems are important. Thus, in all countries venture capital firms finance only a fraction of investments. 
Secondly, the actual behaviour of financial institutions is important. Allthough quantitative information on the 
different systems may reveal certain differences (an issue dealt with in section 2) it may be that the qualitative 
aspects of the financial institutions modify the picture. Thirdly, it is important to stress that there are 
complementarities between the two ways of financing. Financial institutions like venture capital firms, may 
help the firm to grow to a stage where market based financing becomes relevant. In other words both 
market-based and credit-based financing mechanisms co-exists in each nation and seen in a dynamic 
perspective they are often both part of a firms financing sources. The specific combination of markets and 
institutions is a result of the historical evolution of e.g. the financial regulation, production structure, division of 
labour between financing mechanisms. 
 
In addition, some of the drawbacks of close relationships should be pointed to: 
From the point of view of society one could ask: If closer relationships were induced by increased equity 
participation in industrial firms by financial institutions (cf. the German model, where banks are allowed to hold 
large equity stakes in firms and the influence on these firms is particular large and enhanced by the proxy vote 
system), would, then, the overall fragility of the financial system increase as a result? Some observers claim so. 
Another disadvantage of such relationships could be an increased concentration of economic power which may 
be politically undiserable. It could also be argued that most likely this step would require an increased number 
of bank supervisors and administration. 
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One could also ask if well-established relationships prevent an optimal allocation of capital? If some of the 
lending is more or less automatically directed to the firms inside established relationships, then the capital may 
be scarce for firms outside such relationships, which might have grown into more successful firms and rendered 
more employment. This may also have consequences for the build-up of competencies. In a volatile industrial 
environment it is necessary to have a feeling for possible directions of change. However, if financial institutions 
spend many of their resources on maintaining old relationships it may be that they loose the insight in recent 
trends in production outside these relationships and this may harm the evolutionary viability of the 
industry.This has exactly been the traditional arguments why the U.S. financial system may be able to finance 
new, risky ventures in spite of its mainly market based character.
13
  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Perspectives 
 
                                                 
  13  Another explanation could be that business angels finance a substantial part of such new ventures. Financing by 
business angels is very much hands-on and non-market ways of financing, but it may be an important financing source 
before the firm is ready for market-based financing. 
A central theme in the above discussion has been the ability of financial systems to enhance processes at a 
micro-level, which are beneficial for innovation financing. More specifically it has been argued that the intrinsic 
uncertainty in innovations, the importance of interactive learning processes and the tacit knowledge in 
innovation, points to the need for some degree of relationship banking. Similar arguments has been put 
forward previously. For instance Colin Mayer (1988, p.1183) claimed that 
 
"The distinctive feature of successful financial systems is their close involvement in industry. A 
primary characteristic of a market based system is an arm's length relation between investor and 
firm. There are well documented exceptions, but the basic requirement of a market, that investors 
be treated equally, acts against the close involvement of any one party. ... The fundamental 
challenge that faces any institution or government that can affect the practice of finance is to 
encourage the emergence of closer relationships and to direct the wealth of talent that has now 
been concentrated in British financial institutions into direct participation in corporate activities. In 
the process, the apparent attractions of intensifying competition in financial markets may have to be 
resisted. The benefits of competition may only be attained at the expense of longer term economic 
prosperity." 
 
Also some recommendations for changing the U.S. financial system go in this direction. For example, a two-year 
research project by 25 leading U.S. experts pointed to removal of restrictions on ownership in general, and 
more specifically it was suggested that restrictions should be removed on joint ownership of debt and equity. 
Thus, financial institutions should according to this suggestion, be allowed to hold equity for investment 
purposes in companies to which they provide debt financing (Porter, 1992). It was furthermore suggested that 
interactions between capital providers and firms are not productive and should be improved: 
 
“Current interactions between institutional investors and managements are too often cat-and-mouse 
games played around guessing next period’s earnings. What is needed instead are substantive 
discussions about the long-run competitive position of the company.” (Ibid., p.80) 
 
However, it could be questioned if deficiencies in the financial systems such as short-term pressures on 
investments, should justify systemic changes. For example, could interaction between borrowers and lenders 
be enhanced within the institutional and regulatory framework, or are these interactions too dependent upon 
the general institutional framework? 
 
It is a key argument in the section on driving forces behind convergence/divergence of financial systems, that 
demand for capital is determined in part by the structure and development of production. This means that the 
divergence in modes of production may limit convergence of financial systems, vice versa convergence may also 
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enhance convergence of the financial systems, however the convergence of financial systems without links to 
development of production, is in the long run likely to render dysfunctional financial systems, at least seen 
from the perspective of financing innovation. 
 
Therefore a universal best practise may not exist as different financing mechanisms are suitable for different 
types of transactions and firms in different countries. We therefore also argue that it is important to have a 
differentiated view on financial systems. Generalizations of the ability of financial systems to finance 
innovations are likely to render conclusions which are too naive. Instead it is important to recognize that some 
types of investments for example innovations are best supported financially in one way and others by means of 
different financing types. 
 
It should also be noted that financial systems are diverse. Not only are some of the qualitative features of 
financial systems hidden in the general statistics as explained in section 2. Also there are features of financing 
industrial development usually found in credit-based financial systems that exists in market-based systems. For 
example, some firms in the U.K. have close relationships to one bank, who also see financing that customer as a 
long-term commitment to support the firm also in times of crises. Vice versa some financial institutions in the 
credit-based systems (notably pension funds) act more or less as a one-off relationship (traders in shares rather 
than investors) and banks seek to lend only against collateral rather than the future prospects of the firm and 
the abilities of the management team.  
 
This behaviour tend to vary over time. For example, banks in Denmark intensified the relationships to firms 
from the mid-1980s to beginning of 1990s, partly as a result of fierce competition. But huge losses in the 
banking sector in general (something not specific to Denmark) made many banks change strategy from 
relationship banking towards more one-off based transactions. This chang if strategy was in the small firms 
segment who experienced increased requirements to collateral and worse personal service in the bank. 
Consequently the firms began to “shop around” to a larger extent. 
 
The fact that recent studies of innovation activity show that innovation is very different across different size 
groups and in particular across sectors put more macrooriented policies within this area into perspective. It 
may well be that policies aimed at some objectives do not coincide with improving innovation financing. This 
may justify macropolicies, however seen from the perspective of innovation financing the arguments above 
points to the need for a much more disaggregated policy where for example sectoral differences in innovation 
processes - and different needs for financial support - are taken into account. This point is reinforced if we 
adopt the argument above that market-based financial systems have merits in financing high-tech, radically 
new ventures, whereas credit-based systems may be more suitable for financing continuos, incremental 
innovations. At a sectoral level the differences could be said to be the ability of market-based systems to 
stimulate the upspring of new sectors in contrast to the ability of credit-based systems to restructure and 
strenghten existing sectors. On the other hand it indicates that policies at an EU-level could be difficult should 
there be a policy for all European firms regardless of the location and type of firm. 
 
Having said this we should recall that determining exactly what is the need for policies is not possible ex ante. 
But policy makers nevertheless put up both regional, national and super-national programmes for supporting 
innovation financially. It is widely recognized that there is a market failure with respect to equity finance for 
small, innovative firms and that some level of effort is necessary. Thus, in The Green Paper of The Commission  
actions are proposed at both National and Community level. At the national level its is proposed to develop 
mechanisms for innovation risk insurance especially for technology based firm and encouraging banks to 
provide long-term loans, including equity loans and to establish partnerships with expert bodies in appraising 
innovation projects, i.e. expanding the banks competence in relation to innovation financing. Also the need for 
promoting informal venture capital is included in the proposals by the Commission. The development of stock 
markets, both national and pan-European, is to be facilitated through directives removing remaining obstacles. 
Finally different types of funds are suggested at the Community level. On the macro policy level, appropriate 
fiscal treatments of investments, tax reliefs etc. is recommended (p. 42-4). 
The Commission acknowledges that the answer to the innovation financing problem is not to be found in either 
a credit based or a market based financial system, but that both types of finance has to coexist in order to 
provide the necessary institutional variety. We hope to have illustrated that many things remain to be done not 
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only in terms of further research but also in terms of policy actions. In spite of problems with identifying the 
optimal level of intervention surveys generally show a persistent finance gap, especially for innovative firms in 
seed and early stages, which is likely to have severe hampering effects on industrial development. This 
emphasize the importance of actions directed towards closing this particular gap. This paper has pointed to 
some general guidelines for both research and policies. It has particularly emphasized the relationship between 
the macro- and the microaspects of the problem. 
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